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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in J.D.B. v.
North Carolina1 illustrates the Court’s continuing efforts to clarify
when Miranda warnings are necessary.  The Miranda framework re-
quires courts to decide whether, under the circumstances of the inter-
rogation, a reasonable person would have felt free to end the
interrogation and leave.2  This usual framework cannot properly be
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Kelli L. Ceraolo, J.D. Candidate, University of Nebraska College of Law, 2013;
Creighton University, Bachelor of Arts, 2010.  I thank and commend my col-
leagues at the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW for their many hours of work preparing
Volume 91 for publication, and apologize to Benjamin and Brooke for mine.
1. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
2. Id. at 2402.
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applied to interrogations of suspects taking place in the K–12 school
setting because a reasonable person in those circumstances would not
feel free to leave even without the police presence.  In this setting,
where the suspect is already confined, a special rule is necessary.
However, the Court in J.D.B. did not adopt such a rule because it
brushed over the setting issue, focusing instead on the questions of
whether and how to consider age in applying a reasonable person
standard.
The Court framed the question to be decided as “whether the Mi-
randa custody analysis includes consideration of a juvenile suspect’s
age.”3  Acknowledging the “commonsense reality” that youth will often
feel more compelled to answer a police officer’s questions than an
adult in the same situation would,4 the Court held a suspect’s age is
relevant to the custody analysis.5  Although Justice Alito’s vigorous
dissent suggests the Court’s decision portends a dramatic expansion of
the current custody determination,6 this Note argues that the decision
to consider age is not a significant departure from prior holdings, and
the Court missed the opportunity to address the need to alter the cus-
tody analysis for interrogations taking place in the school setting.
Part II first discusses the history of Miranda protections for
juveniles leading up to the Court’s decision in J.D.B., then considers
the relationship between the voluntariness frameworks of the Fourth7
and Fifth8 Amendments, and finally discusses Fourth Amendment
cases in which the Court has held a special rule necessary because the
suspect was confined independent of the police presence.  Part III pro-
vides a brief discussion of consideration of youth in the law and argues
that a special rule is needed for the Court to properly apply the cus-
tody analysis in the school setting.  Finally, Part IV will speculate how
cases like J.D.B. may turn out differently if trial courts apply a special
rule that properly considers the setting.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Miranda Protections for Juveniles
Prior to Miranda v. Arizona,9 the Supreme Court evaluated admis-
sibility of a suspect’s confession under a “voluntariness” test, which
had its roots in English and early American common law.10  Eventu-
ally, this voluntariness requirement became closely tied to both the
3. Id. at 2401.
4. Id. at 2398–99.
5. Id. at 2399.
6. Id. at 2408 (Alito, J., dissenting).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
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Self-Incrimination Clause11 of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Pro-
cess Clause12 of the Fourteenth Amendment.13  For several decades,
prior to holding the Self-Incrimination Clause applicable to the
states,14 the Court focused on Due Process when deciding cases in-
volving coerced confessions.15  These cases eventually refined the test
to “whether the defendant’s will was overborne”16 considering the to-
tality of “all of the attendant circumstances,”17 including both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.18
Age was certainly considered under this “voluntariness” test.  In
Haley v. Ohio, the Court found the methods used in obtaining a juve-
nile suspect’s confession violated his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.19  In arriving at its holding, the Court ac-
knowledged: “That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed
can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.”20
Haley involved a fifteen-year-old boy accused of standing lookout
while two friends robbed a candy store and shot the store owner.21
The defendant was arrested in the middle of the night at his home,
taken to the police station, and interrogated for hours on end without
the opportunity to have counsel or a parent present.22  The Court de-
scribed the suspect as a “mere child—an easy victim of the law,”23 and
said, “[W]e cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the
police in such a contest.  He needs counsel and support if he is not to
become the victim first of fear, then of panic.”24  Eventually, after be-
ing shown confessions of the other youth involved, the boy confessed.25
Before signing his typed confession, the boy was read a statement in-
forming him of his constitutional rights, but the Supreme Court found
this to be insufficient, suggesting that to find otherwise would be to
assume “that a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full
appreciation of that advice.”26
11. “No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself  . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 279 (1936).
14. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964).
15. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433–34.
16. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963).
17. Id.
18. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434.
19. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 597.
22. Id. at 597–98.
23. Id. at 599.
24. Id. at 599–600.
25. Id. at 598.
26. Id. at 601.
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The Court came to a similar decision when applying the voluntari-
ness test in Gallegos v. Colorado.27  Gallegos involved a fourteen-year-
old’s confession to assault and robbery resulting in the death of an
elderly man.28  The suspect was held in police custody for five days
without access to a parent or counsel.29  The State argued the boy had
been told of his right to an attorney, but the Court was unmoved, stat-
ing, “[W]e deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowl-
edge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and
answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his
own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.”30
Although these cases reflect the Court’s enhanced concern about
police intimidation in cases involving juvenile defendants, the age of
the defendant was simply one factor in the “totality of the circum-
stances” considered in the Court’s voluntariness analysis.31  The same
underlying concern about the need to protect individuals from poten-
tial violations of their Constitutional rights during police interroga-
tions arose in cases involving adult suspects as well.32
The shift toward a focus on the Fifth Amendment began when the
Court decided Malloy v. Hogan.33  In Malloy, the Court held the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees witnesses’ Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination even in a state court proceeding.34  A week
after issuing its opinion in Malloy, the Court decided Escobedo v. Illi-
nois, which held a suspect’s confession inadmissible where he had not
been informed of his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney
present in violation of the Sixth Amendment.35  The Escobedo decision
caused a great deal of debate in the legal community, and the Court
sought to clarify its holding when it decided Miranda.36 Miranda in-
volved an adult defendant suspected of kidnapping and rape who con-
fessed after being picked out of a police lineup by his accuser.37  The
defendant was informed of some of his rights, but not specifically the
right to have counsel present.38
27. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
28. Id. at 49–50.
29. Id. at 50.
30. Id. at 54.
31. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).
32. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (finding a violation of due
process where a confession was obtained through brutality).
33. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
34. Id. at 6.
35. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  The dissenting Justices criticized the
majority for interpreting the Sixth Amendment as “amend[ing] or supersed[ing]”
the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 497 (White, J.,
dissenting).
36. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441–42 (1966).
37. See State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965), rev’d, 384 U.S. 434 (1966).
38. Id.
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In arriving at its Miranda decision, the Court reiterated the histor-
ically recognized principle that a custodial police interrogation is in-
herently coercive and therefore heightens the risk that a suspect’s
right against self-incrimination may be violated.39  To protect against
this risk, the Court provided the specific, infamous warnings for law
enforcement agencies’ use to ensure admissibility of suspect state-
ments.  The Court required: “Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any state-
ment he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed.”40  These “procedural safeguards” were deemed necessary
when a suspect is questioned after having been “taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” and
without them, the prosecution could not use any statements stemming
from the interrogation.41
Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has decided numerous cases
that clarify uncertainties related to Miranda warnings.  One such is-
sue considered by the Court is what is required for suspects to assert
their Miranda rights.42  Another major issue considered has been how
to determine when Miranda warnings are required.43  Within this
question, the Court has considered what is relevant to the “circum-
stances” element of the inquiry.44
The Court had faced the issue of whether a suspect’s youth should
be considered in the Miranda analysis before its decision in J.D.B.,
however, its ability to clarify the Miranda decision was limited by the
standard of review in the case. Yarborough v. Alvarado involved a
seventeen-year-old suspect brought to the police station to be inter-
39. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439, 448.
40. Id. at 444.
41. Id.
42. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010) (“Where the prosecution
shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the ac-
cused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the
right to remain silent.”).
43. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (“Miranda warnings are re-
quired only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to
render him ‘in custody.’”); see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)
(“Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circum-
stances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to termi-
nate the interrogation and leave.”); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495) (“the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the
degree associated with a formal arrest”).
44. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 319 (1994) (“[A]n officer’s subjective
and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a sus-
pect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody.”).
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viewed about a robbery-homicide.45  Alvarado was taken to the station
by his parents at law enforcement’s request.46  He was questioned for
about two hours without being given the Miranda warnings and even-
tually confessed to assisting in the crime.47  Alvarado thereafter filed
a writ of habeas corpus.48  The District Court held Alvarado had not
been in custody for Miranda purposes, but the Court of Appeals re-
versed, suggesting the suspect was entitled to enhanced protections
due to his youth.49  Upon review, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that “fairminded [sic] jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado
was in custody,”50 but pointed out that it had never specifically stated
that age was relevant to the Miranda custody analysis.51  It therefore
held that “[t]he state court’s failure to consider [defendant’s] age and
inexperience does not provide a proper basis for finding that the state
court’s decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established
law.”52  The question of whether the suspect’s age is relevant re-
mained unanswered.
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina
The Court’s recent decision in J.D.B. does not conflict with its prior
holding in Alvarado, because, as noted in the majority opinion, the
standard of review applicable to Alvarado neither required nor per-
mitted the Court to reach a conclusion about whether the lower court’s
decision not to consider age was correct.53 J.D.B. allowed the court to
address this issue head on, and that was the question on which the
Court focused.
In J.D.B., police stopped and questioned seventh-grader J.D.B. af-
ter seeing him near the site of two home break-ins.54  Five days later,
after the school resource officer reported that a camera matching one
of the stolen items was in J.D.B.’s possession at school, an investigator
went to the school.55  The uniformed officer working at the school es-
corted thirteen-year-old J.D.B. from his social studies class to a closed-
door conference room, where police and school administrators ques-
45. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 652 (2004).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 652
(2004).
50. Avarado, 541 U.S. at 653.
51. Id. at 666.
52. Id. at 654.
53. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011).
54. Id. at 2399.
55. Id.
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tioned him for at least thirty minutes.56  Neither the police nor the
school officials told J.D.B. he was free to leave the room.57  They did
not read J.D.B. the Miranda warnings or give him the opportunity to
call his guardian.58  J.D.B. eventually confessed, after which the in-
vestigator informed him he could refuse to answer questions and was
free to leave.59  J.D.B. nodded that he understood and provided fur-
ther details of the crimes, including a written statement.60  When the
bell rang, J.D.B. was allowed to take the bus home.61  Two juvenile
petitions were filed against J.D.B., alleging breaking and entering and
larceny.62
J.D.B.’s attorney moved to suppress his statements and any evi-
dence derived therefrom, arguing J.D.B. had been interrogated in a
custodial setting without being afforded Miranda warnings and his
statements were involuntary.63  The trial court denied the motion and
adjudicated J.D.B. delinquent.64  The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals and Supreme Court affirmed, declining to find age relevant to
the determination of whether J.D.B. was in police custody and holding
that a reasonable person would not have believed herself to be in cus-
tody under the circumstances in which J.D.B. confessed.65
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the Miranda custody analysis includes consideration of a ju-
venile suspect’s age.66  The Court reversed the state court and re-
manded to consider all relevant circumstances, including age, in
determining whether J.D.B. was in custody when interrogated.67  In
its 5-to-4 opinion, the Court found it commonsense that “a reasonable
child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to
submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.”68  It empha-
sized that the law should—and does, in other areas—reflect that
reality.69
The Court specifically pointed out that its decision was not incon-
sistent with its prior holding in Alvarado, because the question in that
case was whether the state court’s analysis was “objectively unreason-
able under the deferential standard of review set forth by the Antiter-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2400.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2401.
67. Id. at 2408.
68. Id. at 2403.
69. Id. at 2404.
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rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.”70  The Court further
pointed out that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Alvarado
explained a suspect’s age may be relevant to the custody inquiry.71
The Court dismissed the State’s argument that considering age
would make it difficult for police to determine when Miranda warn-
ings were required.  It argued that ignoring a juvenile’s age, when
known, would “make the inquiry more artificial . . . and thus only add
confusion.”72  Emphasizing that it requires no “imaginative powers,
knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science,
or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s
age,”73 the Court declared courts can acknowledge that children are
different from adults without damaging the objective nature of the
custody analysis.74
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito suggested the majority’s de-
cision would undermine the clarity that was so fundamental to the
basis of the Miranda decision,75 and unnecessarily expanded the cus-
tody analysis used by courts in applying it.76  He emphasized that in-
dividual susceptibility to coercion has no place in a “one-size-fits-all
reasonable-person test”77 and questioned the arbitrary distinction be-
tween a suspect’s age and other personal characteristics that influence
his susceptibility to coercive pressures, such as intelligence, educa-
tion, occupation, or experience with law enforcement.78  In addition to
arguing that the Court’s “makeover” of Miranda was inappropriate,
Justice Alito provides three reasons why it was unnecessary: many
juvenile suspects are just shy of the age of majority; many of the diffi-
culties in applying Miranda arose solely because the interrogation
took place in a school setting; and a vulnerable defendant could al-
ways turn to the prohibition of actual coercion based on the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.79
Part III of this Note will argue that the Court’s decision was not
the radical departure from objectivity that Justice Alito claims, while
agreeing with his assertion that the setting of the interrogation should
have been the focus, rather than the defendant’s age.  First, however,
it is necessary to discuss another area of the law, the history of
which—though seemingly distinct—runs parallel to Fifth Amendment
confession cases in many critical ways.
70. Id. at 2405.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2407.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2403.
75. Id. at 2408.
76. Id. at 2412.
77. Id. at 2409.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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C. Relationship Between Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Frameworks
According to Timothy O’Neill, had Miranda been decided just a
year or two later (after the Court had recognized that listening to a
person’s words could constitute a seizure in wiretapping cases) it
likely would have been considered under a Fourth Amendment in-
quiry instead of the Fifth Amendment.80  Even without accepting
O’Neill’s assertions that “Miranda is a Fourth Amendment case
dressed up in Fifth Amendment clothes,”81 and “interrogation is noth-
ing less than an attempt to ‘search’ a person’s mind,”82 the similarities
between cases decided under the two amendments are striking.
Under the requirements of either amendment, where the police lack
probable cause sufficient for warrant or a subpoena, they generally
need a suspect’s consent before obtaining evidence from him, and
where the false authority of the police has coerced a suspect into coop-
eration, his consent is invalid.83
One way of looking at an interrogation as a type of search is by
adopting the theory that a person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy as to the thoughts in his head, just as he does over the items in
his home.84  Under O’Neill’s justification of Miranda, before police in-
terrogate a suspect in custody, they need to provide warnings so the
suspect understands that, contrary to appearances, the police do not
have the authority to force the suspect to give them information.85
Considering Miranda under the Fourth Amendment instead of, or
in addition, to the Fifth Amendment is not difficult, in part because
the custody analysis under Miranda is nearly identical to the frame-
work faced by courts in questions of consent arising under Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court held that when a
suspect is not in custody, to avoid exclusion of the fruits of a warrant-
less search, the State must demonstrate that consent was voluntarily
given and “not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.”86
In arriving at its holding, the Court looked to the same Due Process,
“voluntariness” body of case law which formed the basis for the Mi-
randa holding.87  The Court noted that determining “whether a defen-
dant’s will was overborne” in these cases required assessing the
80. Timothy P. O’Neill, Rethinking Miranda: Custodial Interrogation as a Fourth
Amendment Search and Seizure, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1109, 1116–17 (2004).
81. Id. at 1114.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1114–15, 1124.
84. Id. at 1124–25.
85. Id.
86. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
87. Id. at 223–27.
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totality of the circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused
and the details of the interrogation.88  The Court declined to hold that
Miranda-like warnings of the right to refuse consent to search were
necessary,89 pointing out that the Miranda Court had found custodial
interrogations inherently coercive and this factor did not necessarily
apply in a search-and-seizure case.90  The Court noted that Miranda
aimed to protect a defendant’s right not to testify against himself at
trial whereas the Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s much
broader privacy interest.91  Aside from the requirement that police ex-
plicitly inform the suspect of her rights, cases involving a question of
voluntariness (of either consent to a search or a confession) result in
extraordinarily similar analyses by courts.
D. Courts’ Handling of Cases Where the Suspect was
Otherwise Confined
The similarity between Fourth Amendment consent to search
cases and Fifth Amendment voluntariness of confession cases is rele-
vant in part because the Supreme Court has frequently considered the
issue of how to account for an already-custodial setting under the
Fourth Amendment framework.
The Supreme Court has said that police officers can approach indi-
viduals at random in airport lobbies and other public places, and can
question them and ask permission to search their luggage without vio-
lating the Fourth Amendment, so long as a reasonable person would
understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.92  In Florida v.
Bostick, two officers boarded the bus on which the defendant was a
passenger while it was making a scheduled stop.93  Although the of-
ficers lacked articulable suspicion, they questioned the defendant and
asked to search his luggage.94  The search uncovered illegal narcotics
and, at trial, the Defendant moved to suppress the drugs as evidence,
arguing it had been seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.95  The Florida Supreme Court held that the defendant had
been seized because a reasonable passenger in his situation would not
88. Id. at 226.
89. Id. at 232.
90. Id. at 240.
91. Id. at 240, 242, 246–47.
92. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (“[N]othing in the re-
cord suggests that the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she
was not free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way,
and for that reason we conclude that the agents’ initial approach to her was not a
seizure.”).
93. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 432.
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have felt free to leave the bus to avoid questioning by the police.96
The state court therefore found that searches performed at random on
buses during scheduled stops were categorically impermissible.97
In its review, the Supreme Court pointed out that had the facts of
the case been slightly different—if defendant was approached while in
the bus terminal, for example—it would not have amounted to a
seizure under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.98  The Court ac-
knowledged that the traditional seizure question of whether a reason-
able person would have felt free to leave could not properly be applied
under the circumstances of the case.99  In addition to the physical con-
finement associated with being approached while seated on a bus, a
passenger likely would not have wished to leave the bus and would
have been stranded and forced to abandon his luggage if he had.  As
the Court put it, “He would not have felt free to leave the bus even if
the police had not been present.”100  Suggesting it was necessary to
consider the principle behind the “free to leave” language,101 the
Court found the case analytically indistinguishable from a prior case,
INS v. Delgado.102
In Delgado, the practice in question was random visits by Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) officers to factories to ques-
tion employees about their citizenship.103  Finding that the employees
were not “detained” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
noted, “Ordinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move
about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law en-
forcement officials, but by the workers’ voluntary obligations to their
employers.”104  The Court remanded Bostick to the lower court, hold-
ing in these types of circumstances, where the “free to leave” analysis
is inapplicable, “the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable per-
son would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise termi-
nate the encounter.”105
The Fourth Amendment cases are illustrative, but difficulties with
the “free to leave” analysis have arisen in Miranda cases as well.  One
notable setting in which courts found the analysis difficult to apply is
when law enforcement questions an inmate of a prison or detention
center.  In Mathis v. United States, decided just two years after Mi-
96. Bostick v. State of Florida, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1989), rev’d, 501 U.S. 429
(1991).
97. Id. at 1156.
98. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
99. Id. at 436.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 435.
102. Id. at 436 (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)).
103. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212.
104. Id. at 218.
105. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
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randa, the Supreme Court held that prisoners subjected to interroga-
tion were entitled to Miranda warnings regardless of the reason for
their confinement.106  The Court held that to apply Miranda only
where the suspect is in custody in connection with the case being in-
vestigated would go “against the whole purpose of the Miranda deci-
sion.”107  The Mathis opinion has been called into question somewhat
by another recent Supreme Court case, Howes v. Fields.108
In Fields, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a
prisoner was in custody for Miranda purposes when officers removed
him from his cell, took him to a conference room, and questioned him
for several hours about an alleged offense unrelated to the one for
which he was serving time.109  Officers repeatedly told the suspect he
was free to go back to his cell if he did not wish to cooperate.110  The
defendant was interviewed about allegations of sexual contact be-
tween him and a minor.111  Although the defendant did not ask for his
attorney or for permission to go back to his cell, he repeatedly told
officers he did not wish to speak to them any longer.112  As the inter-
view continued, the defendant eventually admitted to some contact.113
The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his state-
ments and convicted him of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct.114  The District Court granted the defendant’s writ of habeas
corpus, finding the state court had improperly applied Mathis.115  The
Court of Appeals affirmed.116  The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed.117
The Supreme Court emphasized that it had “repeatedly declined to
adopt any categorical rule with respect to whether the questioning of a
prison inmate is custodial.”118  The Court suggested that a prison in-
terrogation did not involve the coerciveness imagined by Miranda be-
cause: 1) a person already serving a prison term does not encounter
the same shock associated with an arrest; 2) an inmate is unlikely to
be lured into confessing by the longing for a quick release; and 3) an
inmate knows that the officer questioning him lacks the authority to
affect the duration of his sentence.119  For those reasons, the Court
106. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
107. Id. at 4.
108. Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012).
109. Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012).
110. Id. at 815.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 815–16.
115. Id. at 815.
116. Id.
117. Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1185 (2012).
118. Id. at 1187.
119. Id. at 1191.
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held that imprisonment alone is not sufficient to constitute Miranda
custody.120  Although the Court acknowledged that Fields was “not
free to leave the conference room,”121 it nevertheless found that he
had not been in custody for purposes of Miranda.122  The Court fo-
cused on the totality of the circumstances, holding, “When a prisoner
is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on all of the
features of the interrogation.  These include the language that is used
in summoning the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which
the interrogation is conducted.”123
The bus, the workplace, and the prison share a key element: a sus-
pect found in any one of these settings is subject to a sense of confine-
ment independent of any police presence.  The method by which courts
have addressed this factor is remarkably similar regardless of
whether the case raises the issue of consent to a search under the
Fourth Amendment or voluntariness of a confession under the Fifth.
III. ANALYSIS
The Court’s opinion in J.D.B. focused on the issue of the suspect’s
age, rather than the setting of the interrogation.  Consideration of an
actor’s youth, while significant, is not novel or particularly helpful in
circumstances such as those that surrounded J.D.B.’s interrogation.
In focusing on this question, the Court missed a prime opportunity to
adopt and apply a special rule for applying the custody analysis to
interrogations that take place in the school setting.
A. Significance of Youth
Considering an actor’s youth is not a new legal concept.  As re-
flected in the majority opinion in J.D.B., “[t]he law has historically
reflected the . . . assumption that children characteristically lack the
capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete
ability to understand the world around them.”124  One way this as-
sumption is reflected is in legal limitations that apply to youth.  Mini-
mum ages apply to a wide range of activities including the right to
vote,125 the ability to contract,126 motor vehicle operation,127 and alco-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1193.
122. Id. at 1194.
123. Id. at 1192.
124. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (right to vote for persons age eighteen or older).
126. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2101 (Cum. Supp. 2012) (stating that a person over
the age of eighteen may enter into a binding contract or lease).
127. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.057 (2004) (imposing restrictions on driver’s li-
cense issued to a person under eighteen years of age).
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hol consumption.128  Additionally, several recent Supreme Court cases
have demonstrated the Court’s willingness to distinguish between
adult and juvenile criminal suspects and offenders.129
The question of age likely arose in cases involving the Miranda
custody analysis because it reflects a “reasonable person” standard.
In many areas of the law, courts and scholars have grappled with
proper application of the reasonable person standard, particularly
where actors may reasonably interpret a situation differently because
they possess some recognizable character trait that is beyond their
control.130  Youth is one such characteristic.  It is one of the most
widely recognized exceptions to the reasonable person standard in
negligence law,131 and the Court acknowledged this in its J.D.B. deci-
sion.132  The dissent pointed out that the reasonable person standard
in negligence law is a question for a jury and involves a post hoc deter-
mination.133  The significance of this distinction is beyond the scope of
this Note, but clearly both opinions acknowledged the prevalence of
the youth dilemma in the law.
Though the differences between adults and youth are well-ac-
knowledged, the law accommodates these realities with great incon-
sistency.  As Tamar Birckhead suggests, “In some contexts within the
128. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-244(41) (2011) (West) (forbidding a person
under twenty-one from having alcohol in their system).
129. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile who did
not commit homicide); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633
(2009) (holding a thirteen-year-old student’s age relevant in determining that her
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials strip-searched her
on suspicion that she was hiding illicit prescription drugs).
130. See, e.g., Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis:
How Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1733 (2007) (discussing application of the reasonable person standard in negli-
gence law to adults with mental illness); Debra A. Profio, Ellison v. Brady: Fi-
nally, a Woman’s Perspective, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 249, 250 (1992) (discussing
use of a “reasonable woman standard” in sexual harassment cases); Colleen M.
Samples, Recent Decision, The Growing Trend Regarding the Doctrine of In-
formed Consent, Harnish v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152,
439 N.E.2d 240 (1982), 14 CUMB. L. REV. 237, 238 (1983–1984) (discussing the
patient-oriented standard of disclosure defined as “what a reasonable person in
similar circumstances would recognize as material information in making an in-
formed decision whether they should give or withhold consent to a medical or
surgical procedure”).
131. In a negligence case involving a child actor, the majority of jurisdictions use the
following standard of care: “a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and ex-
perience under like circumstances.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A
(1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 10 (2010); Cleveland Rolling-Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 20 N.E. 466 (Ohio
1889).
132. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011).
133. Id. at 2416.
2013] CUSTODY OF THE CONFINED 993
legal system, [juveniles] are considered to be vulnerable, incompetent,
and needing of protection, while in others they are the equivalent of
adults, requiring no such safeguards.”134  This inconsistency exists
not only between different areas of the law, but also between jurisdic-
tions.  State statutory protections for juvenile suspects being ques-
tioned by law enforcement are one example of such a disparity.
In light of research arguing that reciting the Miranda warnings to
juvenile suspects is not enough to protect the rights of juveniles be-
cause they are often incapable of fully comprehending the warn-
ings,135 some states have provided enhanced statutory protections for
juvenile suspects.  For example, in some states, police must notify the
parent or guardian of an accused juvenile before questioning.136  In
some, a parent or an attorney must be present for questioning.137  A
few states require videotaping of interrogations.138  Recognition of the
vulnerability of juvenile suspects is also evident in a federal statute
that requires a federal law enforcement agent taking a juvenile into
custody to “immediately advise such juvenile of his legal rights, in lan-
guage comprehensi[ble] to a juvenile, and . . . immediately notify . . .
the juvenile’s parents, guardian, or custodian.”139  The triggering age
in statutes designed to provide additional protections for juvenile sus-
pects varies by jurisdiction.140
Varying statutory protections, along with the permeation of youth-
related issues throughout the law, demonstrate that the issue of how
to address age is well-recognized, but muddled.  The Court’s opinion in
J.D.B. suggested that treading through the muck—or adding to it—
was the Court’s agenda; however, as Justice Alito’s dissent suggested,
this approach was unnecessary.  The circumstances of J.D.B.’s interro-
134. Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v.
Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 450 (2008).
135. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980); Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to
Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 26 (2006).
136. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2333(a) (West 2011) (requiring officers to contact
the parent or attorney of a suspect under age fourteen when the juvenile is taken
into custody and before the juvenile is interrogated).
137. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101(b) (West 2011) (“When the juvenile is
less than 14 years of age, no in-custody admission or confession resulting from
interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless the confession or admission
was made in the presence of the juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or
attorney.”).
138. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.195 (West 2011) (requiring an audio or audio and
visual recording of the custodial interrogation of a juvenile).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (2006).
140. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101(b) (West 2011) (applying to juveniles
under fourteen years of age) with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 2011)
(applying to juveniles under eighteen years of age).
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gation were troubling, but it is not the suspect’s age which made them
so—it is the setting in which the interrogation took place.
B. Inapplicability of the Traditional Miranda Custody
Analysis
As Justice Alito’s dissent points out, “The Miranda custody rule
has always taken into account the setting in which the questioning
occurs,”141 yet the public school setting in J.D.B. was only briefly men-
tioned in the Court’s decision.  Responding to Justice Alito’s sugges-
tion in the dissent that consideration of age is unnecessary, in part
because the same effect could be achieved by consideration of the cir-
cumstances of school interrogations, Justice Sotomayor pointed out
that “the effect of the schoolhouse setting cannot be disentangled from
the identity of the person questioned.”142  She noted that the “coercive
effect of the schoolhouse setting” depends on whether the suspect is a
minor—required to attend school and subject to disciplinary action for
disobedience—or an adult visiting the school voluntarily.143
It seems arguable that age could, indeed, be separated from the
context, so long as the voluntariness of the context was considered.  In
the prison context, for example, the Court has not felt it necessary to
point out that questioning an individual visiting an inmate at a
prison, or a delivery-driver bringing towels to the prison, would not
likely result in the same analysis as where the questioning is directed
toward a prisoner, yet the difference in the risk of coercion seems ap-
parent.  Regardless of whether consideration of age would be rendered
irrelevant, adoption of a new rule for the school context is necessary
for the same reasons as the rule adopted in Fourth Amendment cases
involving confinement unrelated to the police presence: you cannot
ask whether a suspect is made to not feel “free to leave” by police when
the suspect already did not feel free to leave.
C. Applying a Special Rule to the School Setting
Although J.D.B. did not present a Fourth Amendment question,
the circumstances are akin to those in Bostick and Delgado in that
factors independent of the police presence prevented the defendant
from feeling “free to leave.”  In J.D.B., these external factors related to
the school setting.  Perhaps most obviously similar to the circum-
stances of Bostick, a middle school student who relies on bus transpor-
tation has no reasonable means of leaving the school building in the
middle of the day.  But the student is not only confined to the building.
A reasonable youth, subject to school rules and their accompanying
141. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2405.
143. Id.
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sanctions, as well as compulsory education laws,144 would undoubt-
edly not feel free to leave any room at the school where he was specifi-
cally instructed to be.
Like in the Fourth Amendment cases, this sense of confinement is
independent of the police presence, but is not the result of a voluntary
decision to ride the bus like in Bostick or to work in a particular fac-
tory like in Delgado.  Rather, the confinement is compelled by law in-
dependent of the law enforcement presence.  In this sense, the
confinement is similar to that experienced by persons in a detention
facility or prison.  A prisoner is certainly not at liberty to leave the
building and, unless being told so, is probably not at liberty to walk
out of a particular room at the facility either.  While it may be a
stretch to analogize the two settings too closely—and in fact, the
Court has said it is “not yet ready to hold that the schools and the
prisons need be equated”145—the “free to leave” analysis is equally
inapplicable in either.
If a “free to terminate the encounter” test is applied to the context
of a juvenile being questioned at a public school, the court should fre-
quently find that the student did not have such liberty and a reasona-
ble student would not perceive such a liberty.  A student in a school is
in an inherently subordinate position.  Everything about the situation
suggests to the student that he or she must comply, cooperate, and
respect the authority of adults.
Additionally, while the school setting is similar to other confining
settings like the bus and the workplace, a case involving interrogation
in the school setting will often be distinguishable in a key aspect:
neither Bostick’s bus driver nor Delgado’s employer were involved in
the interrogation.  In J.D.B., the police investigator, school resource
officer, and two school administrators were present, observing and
participating in the suspect’s questioning.  This distinction is crucial
because, had the bus driver or the employer taken an adverse role
alongside police in the interrogation, the suspect would have been
forced to choose between answering the questions and potentially giv-
ing up something of great value: a job or a necessary means of
transportation.
When faced with the messy question of police interrogations that
take place in schools, courts have tended to not consider school admin-
144. In Florida, education is compulsory from age six to age sixteen. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1003.21 (West 2011).  Education is compulsory in all states, however, the age
range varies. See Age range for compulsory school attendance and special educa-
tion services, and policies on year-round schools and kindergarten programs, by
state: Selected years, 1997 through 2008, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STA-
TISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_165.asp (last visited
Nov. 5, 2012).
145. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
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istrator involvement to weigh in favor of requiring Miranda warnings.
In determining whether Miranda warnings are necessary, Peter Price
described four categories of schoolhouse interrogations: (1) situations
where school officials initiate the interrogation or police involvement
is minimal; (2) situations where police or liaison officers are acting on
their own authority; (3) situations where police officers initiate the in-
terrogation; and (4) situations where school resource officers or
outside officers are heavily involved at the behest of school officials.146
Price describes the categorization as boiling down to two questions:
who began the investigation and who conducted the investigation?
Where school officials initiated or conducted the investigation, courts
lean toward finding no obligation to give Miranda warnings.  This
trend follows case law based on other constitutional claims of stu-
dents, which suggest the interest in maintaining a proper learning en-
vironment requires that school administrators be granted more
leeway than other state actors.147  However, in cases where adminis-
trators and law enforcement work together to elicit a confession from
a student, it is precisely the act of collaboration which supports the
necessity of a special rule.
While the investigator asked questions, the assistant principal en-
couraged J.D.B. to cooperate.148  J.D.B.’s choice amounted to more
than simply whether or not to cooperate with the investigator.  He was
forced to decide whether or not to obey school officials.  Such circum-
stances amount to precisely the kind of duress that Miranda sought to
avoid, and under this analysis, irrelevant of his age, J.D.B. was in cus-
tody for Miranda purposes and was entitled to be read his rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the heart of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause
and the Supreme Court’s Miranda decision is the fundamental need to
balance society’s desire to prosecute criminals against the risks to in-
dividual rights inherent in police investigations.149  Frequently, the
146. Peter Price, When is a Police Officer an Officer of the Law?: The Status of Police
Officers in Schools, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541, 550–51 (2008–2009).
147. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to searches conducted by school officials, and students have an ex-
pectation of privacy in school, but declaring the warrant and probable cause
requirements inapplicable and finding reasonableness sufficient); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975) (relaxing the notice and hearing requirements of the Due
Process Clause for student disciplinary actions); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (finding a student entitled to their First
Amendment free speech rights except where school authorities reasonably antici-
pate a material and substantial disruption to the school’s operation).
148. Brief for the State at 6, In re J.B., 644 S.E.2d 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (No.
COA08-499), 2008 WL 4574765.
149. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445–61 (1966).
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suspect’s age will be less significant in determining the risk to consti-
tutional rights than the setting of the interrogation.  Had the Court
adopted a bright-line rule in Miranda that required the warnings only
when the suspect had been formally arrested, police would have been
able to circumvent the law by interrogating suspects without first
placing them under formal arrest.  This concern demands a special
rule that properly accounts for the already-confined nature of the pub-
lic K–12 setting.  Such a rule is necessary to prevent law enforcement
from abusing the setting knowing that there exists a tendency to relax
Constitutional obligations when the state actors are school officials.
Rather than a “free to leave” analysis, suspects interrogated in a
school setting should be informed of their Miranda rights unless a rea-
sonable person would, under the circumstances, feel free to terminate
the conversation and go about their normal activities.
In cases like J.D.B., where school officials and law enforcement are
collaborating in an interrogation of a student, and the interrogation is
taking place in school, during school hours, courts should find that
students are “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda, because a rea-
sonable student would not feel free to terminate the conversation and
ignore the requests of school officials.  Under this rule, police would be
required to advise students like J.D.B. of their Miranda rights before
questioning.  Where, as in J.D.B., Miranda warnings were not given,
the student’s statements should be inadmissible in a subsequent pros-
ecution.  This approach is necessary to avoid the constitutional prob-
lem of putting students at heightened risk of coerced self-
incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
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